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Abstract
From 2018 through 2019, the United States and China imposed a series of wide-ranging increases
in import tariffs which have dramatically raised trade barriers between the two largest economies
in the world. With a focus on the import side, this paper provides evidence on the impact of the
trade war on China’s trade quantities and prices, and estimates related trade elasticities. Both
Chinese import quantities and values dropped sharply following the tariffs and there is evidence
for incomplete pass-through of Chinese import tariffs in the very short run. More importantly,
this paper shows that while China’s non-processing imports declined dramatically during the trade
war, the processing imports almost remain unaffected. The results suggest that the Chinese special
duty-free policy on processing trade may have served as a built-in mechanism to better protect
domestic firms from the damage of the trade war through the global value chain channel.
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1. Introduction
From 2018 to 2019, the import tariffs enacted by the United States and the following retaliation
by China have dramatically raised trade barriers between the two largest economies in the world.
Recent studies have documented the effect of this trade war on the US economy (Amiti et al. 2019;
Fajgelbaum et al. 2019). However, the story from China’s perspective is yet to be told. During5
the trade war, China levied six rounds of retaliatory tariffs on over 5,000 products from the United
States, with rates ranging between 10 to 50 percent. The products that were subject to the tariffs
account for over 80 percent of China’s total imports from the United States, in terms of trade value.
The economic consequences of these bilateral tariffs on Chinese trade flows and prices depend
on the tariff incidence and elasticities. First, are the tariffs being passed on to consumers or being10
absorbed by the producers? Second, are domestic firms seeking alternative destination countries
to export? Moreover, it is important to understand how trade policy plays out in a global value
chain era, especially under China’s context: near half of China’s total trade volume are processing
trade, in which China import parts from foreign countries, assembling or processing them into final
products to be re-exported.15
Using monthly Chinese customs data from 2017-2019, this paper offers a comprehensive picture
of the impact of tariffs on China’s trade quantities and prices. Starting with a focus on Chinese
import side, I first show the direct impact of Chinese import tariffs on trade quantities and prices.
Second, I estimate Chinese import demand and US export supply elasticity using tariff changes
as instruments. Third, I embed the analysis into a global value chain context by focusing on the20
differences between Chinese processing import and ordinary imports. Finally, I look at the impact
of US import tariffs on Chinese exports, with a focus on trade diversion effect.
I find a large decline in Chinese imports when the retaliatory tariffs were implemented. Looking
at the month-to-month changes, a one percent increase in Chinese retaliatory tariff immediately
leads to a 0.87 percent decrease in import quantities and a 1.38 percent decrease in import val-25
ues of targeted products, respectively. The prices of targeted products received by US exporters
(duty-exclusive unit values) decreased by 0.51 percent and the price paid by Chinese importers
(duty-inclusive unit values) increased by 0.49 percent. These results imply incomplete tariff pass-
through of Chinese import tariffs in the very short-run. The impact are much larger when I look
at year-to-year changes. A one percent tariff increase results in a 3.94 percent decrease in target30
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products’ import quantities and a 3.08 percent decrease in values. Following the approach taken by
Fajgelbaum et al. (2019), I use the tariff changes as instruments and estimate the Chinese import
demand elasticity to be 1.76 in the short run and 2.11 in the relatively long-run.
Compared to the US trade regime, the most distinct feature of Chinese imports is that nearly
half are processing imports which are used in export-oriented products. Two major processing35
trade regimes are called “processing-with-assembly” and “processing-with-inputs” with the latter
one be the dominant component of Chinese processing imports since 2000. It is important to
identify the processing imports because Chinese trade policy exempts such imported inputs from
tariffs. Even during the trade war, these special tariff treatments on processing imports remain
largely unchanged in practice. Therefore, despite the high retaliatory import tariffs enacted by the40
Chinese government, we would not expect to see processing imports getting a large direct impact.
In the data, I directly observe each transaction’s trade regime which allows me to separately analyze
the effects on ordinary trade and processing trade. When estimated by trade regimes, I find that
the impact of the tariffs are almost purely driven by ordinary imports while there is no statistically
significant effect on processing imports. The results are likely to be driven by the special duty-45
free policy. These results highlight the importance to consider the institutional details in trade
policy—especially the difference to the US.
On the Chinese export side, one potential consequence of US import tariffs that has occupied
the forefront of the debate among politicians as well as economists is the trade diversion effect
(Gonzalez and Veron 2019). Facing the US import tariffs, were Chinese exporters reorienting or50
even dumping their products towards other countries? If so, as politicians have claimed, the trade
war between US and China may have caused collateral damage on domestic firms in EU and other
countries. However, by examining the relationship between US import tariffs and Chinese exports
to the rest of the world other than the US, I do not find any overall trade diversion effect. Although I
observe trade diversion on some specific products such as aluminum by plotting the trends, product55
characteristics such as differentiation or the elasticity of substitution cannot explain the degree of
trade diversion, leaving considerable unexplained heterogeneity across products.
A key challenge in getting unbiased estimates in this paper is to address the potential endogeneity
of tariff changes. The analysis in my paper requires the trade war tariffs to be exogenous and
uncorrelated with potential supply and demand shocks. Most rounds of tariffs from both China60
and US were announced and enacted in a very short time-period. Therefore, anticipation effect
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may not have enough time to play an important role. I also perform several robustness checks by
testing pre-trend and by visualizing the trends before and after the tariffs were being implemented
using an event-study framework. The results show that there is no significant pre-trend before the
tariffs were implemented.65
This paper first contributes to the on-going research on the impact of the 2018-2019 trade
war. Amiti et al. (2019) look at the impact of the 2018 tariffs on US prices. They find that both
US export and import quantities dropped significantly following the US import tariffs and other
countries’ retaliatory tariffs. Also, the US import tariffs have been almost entirely passed through
into domestic prices, leaving exporter prices unchanged. Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) find similar70
results. They use the tariff changes as instruments to estimate the trade elasticities and show that
the US import demand elasticity is around 2.5 and the elasticity of foreign demand for US products
to be unitary. They further embed the estimated elasticities in a general-equilibrium model to find
that the US aggregate real income loss from the trade war is 0.04 percent of GDP. Other research
have examined the impact of trade war from the US perspective at a more micro-level. Cavallo75
et al. (2019) find complete tariff pass-through to border prices during the trade war. Flaaen et al.
(2020) show that the US consumer price of washing machine increased significantly following the
US import tariffs. While both the US and China are important countries in global trade, the roles
they play are very different. For example, one major category of products that China imports from
the US is agricultural products, which tend to have a relatively high elasticity of substitution. My80
results show that the quantity and value of agriculture products that China imported from US
declined much more than other products as China may have shifted its sources to countries such
as Brazil and Argentina. Such information will be important in terms of trade policy making and
the negotiation of a trade deal between US and China. Also, while related literature have found
complete pass-through of US import tariffs, I find incomplete pass-through of China’s retaliatory85
tariffs, at least in the very short-run.
To the best of my knowledge, my paper is one of the first to look at the impact of the trade
war from China’s perspective. The only exception is the recent work by Benguria et al. (2020) who
use pre-trade war custom data to measure firm-level exposure to the trade war and then study the
impact of tariffs on Chinese listed firms. My paper further contributes by providing a comprehensive90
picture of the impact of the trade war on the universe of Chinese importers and exporters using
up-to-date data.
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The paper also contributes to the literature on trade policy in the global value chain era. Since
the Reform and Open in 1978, processing trade experienced a rapid increase as a result of China’s
comparative advantage in low-skilled labor. In fact, the share of processing imports is larger than95
the share of ordinary imports from 1996 to 2007 (Yu and Zhu 2019). More importantly, processing
imports enjoy a special duty-free tariff treatment even during the trade war. Therefore, it is very
important to recognize the special role that processing trade plays when analyzing trade-related
topic under China’s context (Feenstra et al. 2014; Yu 2015; Dai et al. 2014; Tian and Yu 2019).
Meanwhile, during the trade war, the global supply chains could potentially magnify the impact of100
import tariffs by transmitting the import tariffs to exports (Boehm et al. 2019). The recent work
by Handley et al. (2020) shows that a large share of US exports were facing increased tariffs on
importing inputs during the trade war, which in turn leads to a even larger decline in exporting.
Flaaen and Pierce (2019) show that U.S. manufacturing industries more exposed to tariff increases
experience relative reductions in employment as a positive effect from import protection is offset105
by larger negative effects from rising input costs and retaliatory tariffs. Therefore, while trade wars
have always been disruptive, they are particularly expensive and divisive in the global value chain
era as the import tariffs could backfire on domestic production (Blanchard 2019). Although at the
later stage of the trade war Trump’s administration has allowed firms to apply for tariff exemptions,
the effect might be small especially for smaller firms. On the contrary, the Chinese special duty-free110
policy on processing trade may have served as a built-in mechanism to better protect domestic firms
from the damage of the trade war through the global value chain channel.
Finally, this paper also contributes to the trade diversion literature. A large literature have
examined the trade diversion effect created by different free trade agreements and regional trade
agreements (e.g., Magee 2008; Dai et al. 2014). In the context of bilateral trade conflicts, Nicita115
(2019) shows that one consequence of the tariffs between United States and China has been to
increase United States imports from elsewhere. Bekkers and Schroete (2020) show that the reduction
in trade between the US and China in 2019 and is accompanied by considerable trade diversion to
imports from other regions. Feenstra and Hong (2020) suggest that the Phase One trade agreement,
which mandates China to purchase additional imports from the US worth $200 billion in 2020 and120
2021, would result in trade diversion away from the rest of the world. However, with all the
discussion about trade diversion, I show that there is no systematic diversion going on except in
some selected products.
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The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and lists the key
events during the trade war. Section 3 provides an event-study framework to visualize the impact125
of the trade war. Section 4 shows the main empirical specifications and the estimation results.
Section 5 performs the robustness checks and Section 6 concludes.
2. Data Description and Key Events
This section describes the data, lists the key events during the trade war and shows stylized facts
about the response of Chinese imports to the series of tariffs.130
2.1. Data
The primary data I use is the administrative Chinese monthly import and export data from the
General Administration of Customs. The data period covers from January 2017 to December 2019.
It records the universe of Chinese import and export transactions and has a variety of information
for each transaction, including product (HS-8 level), quantity, value, and firm’s location (at the135
province-level). More importantly, I can also observe each transaction’s trade regime which allows
me to perform analysis separately on processing and ordinary trade.
However, I do not directly observe the custom duties or tariff lines in the data. Therefore, I
combine data from multiple additional sources and construct a monthly panel data set of tariffs.
The US-China specific tariffs data during the trade war are obtained from the Ministry of Finance140
of China, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) and Li (2018) trade war tariff dataset.
These ad valorem tariffs are mostly set at the HS-8 level. Since many rounds of tariffs were enacted
in the middle of the month, I scale the tariffs by the number of days of the month they were in
effect.1
To construct the baseline Chinese import tariffs, I first collect the Most Favored Nation (MFN)145
tariff rates at the HS-8 level published by the central government of China. Then I compile the
list of country-products that are subject to regional trade agreements. These include, for example,
the tariffs applied to products from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), from
1For example, if a 25% tariff was enacted on June 15, then the effective tariff will be 25×15/30=12.5% in June
and 25% in the following month.
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35 Least-developed countries (LDC), and from other countries (regions) which have signed specific
trade agreements with China.2 Then I compute the effective Chinese import tariff rate for each150
country-product pair (variety) as the sum of the baseline tariff rate and the announced trade
war tariff rate changes. In the baseline analysis, I ignore the changes in Chinese MFN tariffs
and regional trade agreements during the trade war. Therefore, I only use the trade war tariff
changes as identifying variation.3 However, each year China also adjusted the MFN rates due to
the commitment to the WTO and sign/modify the regional trade agreements.4 It is difficult to155
judge whether some of the changes were driven by the trade war. Thus, I also examine all the official
documents published by the Ministry of Finance of China and present the results that include all
the tariff adjustments in the appendix.
On the Chinese export side, most US import tariffs are set at the HS-8 or HS-10 level which is
not directly comparable when using the Chinese export data. Thus, I first use the publicly available160
2017 US import data from the US Census Bureau and the trade war specific tariffs from the USITC
to calculate the trade weighted tariffs at the HS-6 level. Then I combine it with the WTO database
of MFN rates and merge with the Chinese export data.
2.2. Key Events
Table 1 reports the scope of the six waves of Chinese import tariffs. Following the US tariffs on steel165
and aluminum, the first wave of China’s retaliatory tariffs began in April 2018 targeted 128 HS-8
level products. The second wave implemented in July 2018 only targeted for 545 distinct products
(mostly agricultural products), but the total value of these products exceeds 3 billion USD. Starting
from September 2018, additional tariffs have been added to most products that China imported
from the US and the scale of these tariffs were being elevated again in 2019.170
Figure 1 shows the average applied tariff on products that were being targeted in each wave.
For products that were being targeted in the first three waves, the average ad valerom tariff has
been increased to over 30%. And in the later stage of the trade war, the majority of products that
2These include South Korea, Laos, Macao, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Switzerland,
Taiwan, Chile, Australia, Iceland, Costa Rica Georgia, and Hongkong.
3Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) also ignore the changes in US import tariffs due to preexisting treaty commitments
when analyzing the impact of trade war on US imports.
4These include, for example, the MFN changes in 2018:1, 2018:7, 2019:1 and 2019:7; the changes in regional trade
agreements with countries such as Korea in 2018 and 2019.
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China imported from the US were subjected to tariffs over 20%.
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Tariffs on Chinese Imports
Tariffs Date # of Products Value (mil USD) Average Tariff (%)
Wave 1 Apr 2, 2018 128 297 16
Wave 2 July 6, 2018 545 3383 25
Wave 3 Aug 23, 2018 333 1411 25
Wave 4 Sep 24, 2018 5207 5816 8.4
Wave 5 June 1, 2019 4544 4022 11.7
Wave 6 Sep 1, 2019 1717 2866 7.7
Notes: Number of products is at the HS-8 level. Value is calculated as the 2017
annual import value of targeted products in each wave. Average tariff is calculated
as the unweighted ad valerom average tariff across targeted products.


















Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6
Average Applied Tariff
2017 2019
Figure shows the unweighted average applied Chinese import tariff rates of tar-
geted products for each wave in 2017 and 2019.
2.3. Variation across Sectors175
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for Chinese import tariffs across broad SITC one-digit sec-
tors. It shows that China placed most protections on machinery and transport equipment sector as
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well as crude materials sector which include products such as soybean. Meanwhile, the unweighted-
average tariff increases on targeted import products are similar across sectors. This suggests that
China was not choosing specific sectors to target because otherwise we should observe tariff variation180
across sectors.
Table 3 shows the change of the share of US products by SITC one-digit sectors. By 2019, the
quantity share of US products dropped sharply in almost all the sectors which suggests China was
switching its import sources. However, the US share in machinery and transport equipment sector,
where China placed most protections, did not vary significantly. On the contrary, the US share in185
agricultural-related sectors experienced a dramatic decline.
Table 2: Tariff Variation by SITC Sector
SITC Category # of Products Value (mil USD) Average Tariff (%)
Machinery and transport equipment 1403 3232 18
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 276 2830 19
Chemicals and related products 964 1169 18
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 881 1027 19
Manufactured goods 1623 703 19
Commodities and transactions 6 477 21
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 53 407 25
Food and live animals 215 340 21
Beverages and tobacco 32 30 26
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 32 11 22
Notes: Number of products is at the HS-8 level. Value is calculated as the 2017
annual import value of targeted products in each SITC category. Average tariff is calculated
as the unweighted ad valerom average tariff across targeted products in each category.
3. Event Study Framework
To better visualize the effects of tariff increases on Chinese import, I implement an event study
specification. Specifically, I compare the trends of targeted products from the US to the same
HS-8 products from other countries which were not subject to the tariff increases. The equation I




β0j✶[t = j] +
j=6∑
j=−6
β1j✶[t = j]× Targetic + fic + fct + fit + ǫict (1)
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Table 3: Quantity Share of China’s Import from the United States by SITC Category
SITC Category 2017 US Share 2019 US Share
Food and live animals 25.28 8.69
Commodities and transactions 9.25 0.04
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 6.49 5.39
Chemicals and related products 5.08 3.14
Manufactured goods 4.08 1.81
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 3.84 1.91
Machinery and transport equipment 3.27 3.24
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 2.41 1.06
Beverages and tobacco 2.23 1.34
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 1.05 0.03
Notes: the denominators are the annual total quantity of Chinese imports in each sector.
where yict represents quantity, value, duty-exclusive unit value or duty-inclusive unit value for
product i (HS-8) from country c at month t. j represents the introduction time of each round of
tariffs. Targetic equals to one if product i was subject to the Chinese retaliatory tariffs and equals190
to zero otherwise. fic is the product-country fixed effects, fit is the product-month fixed effects,
fct is month-country fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at HS8-country level. β1j is
the coefficient of interest. It is identified by comparing targeted variety to the non-targeted variety
within the same HS product code at the same time. Following Fajgelbaum et al. (2019), the event
date of targeted product is the nearest full month when the tariffs were enacted while the event195
date of non-targeted product is the earliest event date within the same HS code as the targeted
product.5 Event times less than -6 (i.e., 6 months before the roll out) are dropped and event times
greater than 6 are binned together. Therefore, this event study framework only shows the trend in
the very short-run.
One caveat of this event-study framework described above is that during the trade war, many200
products were being targeted multiple times. However, under this specification, for the non-targeted
products within the same HS code, I can only assign one event date to them. Therefore, for products
being targeted multiple times, the trend before the event may be affected by the previous rounds of
tariffs. In order to show a less noisy trend, figure 2 reports the event-study coefficients by focusing
5For example, if a product was targeted in both the Sep 24, 2018 wave and June 1, 2019 wave, the event date
for this product will be October 2018.
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on products that were only being targeted once by Chinese import tariffs. The error bar shows205
95% confidence intervals. Overall, I observe downward trends on both import quantities and values
immediately following the tariffs. The before-duty unit value was fluctuated but mostly are not
significantly different from zero. In contrast, the duty-inclusive unit value increased by around 10
percent following the tariffs. The event-study also suggests that there is no significant anticipation
effect that would complicate the elasticity estimates. While there is an upward trend in total210
import value before the tariffs were being implemented, they are not statistically different from
zero. Therefore, the concern that importers might anticipate the upcoming tariffs and purchase
earlier seems to be minimal.
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Figure plots the event-study dummies estimated from equation (1). Error bar shows 95% confidence
interval. Products being targeted multiple times during the trade war were dropped to avoid noisy
trends caused by previous rounds of tariffs.
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4. Empirical Strategy and Estimations
4.1. Impact of Chinese Tariffs on Chinese Imports215
4.1.1. Reduced-form Analysis
A key first step in analyzing the impact of the trade war is to understand how prices and quantities
move in response to a tariff change. Therefore, I estimate the following regression:
∆log[zict] = η∆log(1 + τict) + fct + fit + fic + ǫict (2)
where z ∈ {q, p×q, p∗, p}≡ {import quantity, import value, duty-exclusive unit value, duty-
inclusive unit value}. τict represents the statutory import tariff rates.
6 The regression includes
country-time fixed effects, product-time fixed effects and product-country fixed effects to control
for seasonality, time-varying country-specific factors, and product-country time-invariant trends.220
Under the assumption that the import tariffs enacted by Chinese government are exogenous, the
coefficient of interest η is identified using variation in product-country-level over time. The robust
standard errors are clustered at the country-HS8-level. Each regression is run separately in month-
to-month differences and year-to-year differences to capture the very short-run trends and relatively
long-run trends.225
Table 4 panel A reports the responses of Chinese imports to the tariff changes in first differences.
Column (1) shows that import quantities dropped sharply following the tariff increases. Column
(2) shows that the decline in import values is even larger, because the before-duty unit values
(received by US exporters) also decreased as shown in column (3). Column (4) shows that a one
percent increases in tariff resulted in a 0.49 percent increases in duty-inclusive unit values (paid230
by Chinese importers).7 The results from column (3) and (4) are interesting because it provides
evidence that, at least in the very short-run, the incidence of Chinese import tariffs was borne by
both Chinese importers and US exporters. Amiti et al. (2019) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) examine
6I ignore the changes in baseline MFN rates and changes in regional trade agreements during 2018 and 2019.
Thus, I only use the import tariffs changes as the result of the trade war as identifying variation in the main analysis.
Results including all tariff changes can be found in table A7-A8 in the appendix.
7Because I do not directly observe the duty-inclusive unit value in the data, I impute the duty-inclusive unit
value as p = p∗ × (1+ τ). Therefore mechanically the coefficient in column (4) is 1 plus the coefficient in column (3).
However, the coefficient in column (3) alone is sufficient to show the tariff incidence.
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Table 4: Impact of Chinese Tariffs on Chinese Imports






(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ln(1 + τict) -0.87*** -1.38*** -0.51*** 0.49***
(0.30) (0.26) (0.14) (0.14)
Product × time FE Y Y Y Y
Country × time FE Y Y Y Y
Product × country FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.11
N 2,328,703 2,328,703 2,328,703 2,328,703






(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ln(1 + τict) -3.94*** -3.08*** 0.86*** 1.86***
(0.18) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10)
Product × time FE Y Y Y Y
Country × time FE Y Y Y Y
Product × country FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.19
N 1,513,561 1,513,561 1,513,561 1,513,561
Notes: Column (1)-(4) report log changes in import quantities, values, before-duty unit
values, and duty-inclusive unit values regressed on log changes in statutory tariff rates.
Robust standard errors in the parentheses are clustered by country and HS-8. Significance:
* 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
the impact of US tariffs on US imports and find complete pass-through of tariffs to duty-inclusive
import prices. However, the reduced-form estimates in my paper suggest incomplete pass-through235
of Chinese import tariffs in the very short-run.
Table 4 panel B reports the responses of Chinese imports to the tariff changes in twelve-month
differences. Over a year, import quantities and values declined significantly more than in the very
short-run. A one percent increase in tariff resulted in a 3.94 percent decrease in quantities and a 3.08
percent decrease in import values, respectively. However, both before-duty and duty-inclusive unit240
values increased in the relatively long-run in response to the import tariffs. The result in Column
(3) suggests that in the relatively long-run Chinese importers were paying higher prices to the US
exporters. One possible explanation is that during the trade war, the US import tariffs increased
the production cost for the US manufactures through the global supply chain. Therefore, the US
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exporters were adjusting to this cost shock and eventually raised their prices. Under this hypothesis,245
the before-duty unit values should have increased more for ordinary trade than for processing trade
because the former are primarily final products and the latter are mostly intermediate inputs. In
section 4.2 I show that this is the case.
4.1.2. IV Estimation of Trade Elasticities
Beyond the reduced-form analysis above, the tariff changes could be viewed as a natural experiment250
to further estimate the Chinese import demand elasticity and US export supply elasticity. The
estimations of these elasticities can be important for future welfare analysis.
I follow the previous literature to use the variation in Chinese import tariffs to estimate the
Chinese import demand elasticity and US export supply elasticity simultaneously (Romalis 2007;
Zoutman et al. 2018; Fajgelbaum et al. 2019). To be more specific, I estimate the following two255
equations:
∆log[qict] = −σ∆log[pict] + fct + fit + fic + ǫict (3)
∆log[p∗ict] = ω∆log[qict] + fct + fit + fic + ǫict (4)
Equation (3) identifies the Chinese import demand elasticity σ by regressing observed import
quantities on import duty-inclusive unit values, using change in log tariffs ∆ln(1 + τict) as instru-
ments for import duty-inclusive unit values. Equation (4) identifies the US supply elasticity ω by
regressing before-duty unit values on observed import quantities, using ∆ln(1+τict) as instruments260
for observed quantities.
Intuitively, as long as the incidence of the tariff is shared between both sides, for a given price
received by US exporter (before-duty price), an exogenous increase in Chinese import tariffs will
affect the Chinese import demand through and only through the change in duty-inclusive prices paid
by the Chinese importers. Conversely, for a given price paid by the Chinese importers, an exogenous265
tariff increase will shift up the US supply curve through and only through reducing the quantities
ordered by the Chinese importers. The identification assumption here is that the Chinese retaliatory
tariffs are uncorrelated with unobserved import demand or foreign export supply shock. The
multiple fixed effects included in the estimation control for potential unobserved trends. Meanwhile,
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Table 5: IV Estimation of Chinese Import Demand Elasticity and US Export
Supply Elasticity









Product × time FE Y Y
Country × time FE Y Y
Product × country FE Y Y
N 2,328,703 2,328,703









Product × time FE Y Y
Country × time FE Y Y
Product × country FE Y Y
N 1,513,561 1,513,561
Notes: Robust standard errors in the parentheses are clustered by
country and HS-8. Significance: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
the event-study framework shows no significant preexisting trend prior to the implementation of270
the tariffs. In section 5, I formally perform robustness checks to test the preexisting trends which
provide support to this identification assumption.
Under this specification, Column (4) and column (1) in table 4 panel A serve as the first-stage
estimation for equation (3) and (4), respectively. Column (1) and (2) in table 5 panel A report
the IV estimation of σ and ω, respectively. It shows that the estimated Chinese import demand275
elasticity is 1.76. The estimated positive US supply elasticity supports the finding of incomplete
tariff pass-through in the reduced-form analysis above. Compared to the estimation from the US
side, Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) estimate the US import demand elasticity to be 2.53 and the foreign
supply elasticity to be a statistical zero. One potential explanation for China to have a lower import
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demand elasticity is the special processing trade regime as I will discuss in detail below.280
Table 5 panel B shows the estimation at twelve-month differences with Column (4) and column
(1) in table 4 panel B as the first-stage. The Chinese import demand elasticity is larger in relatively
long-run. The sign of estimated US export supply elasticity, however, turns negative which implies
a downward sloping inverse supply curve in the relatively long run.
4.2. The Impact on Ordinary and Processing Imports285
When analyzing the tariff incidence in the Chinese context, it is important to distinguish ordinary
imports and processing imports because processing imports enjoy a special duty-free tariff treat-
ment. Table 6 reports a simple summary statistics for Chinese import transaction data by trade
regimes and year from 2017-2019. Overall, at the HS-8 product level, approximately 60 percent of
total import value comprises ordinary imports, whereas processing imports account for around 40290
percent.
Table 6: Chinese Transaction-level Trade Data by Trade Regimes and Year
Imports by Trade Regimes 2017 2018 2019
Percentage of import value
Ordinary imports 58.7 59.7 60.5
Processing imports 39.3 39.1 38.0
Processing trade in China started after the reform and opening-up in 1978. In order to promote
development and take advantage of low labor costs, the Chinese government encouraged firms to
import raw materials or intermediate inputs, and re-export the final goods after processing. Today,
the Chinese Custom reports very detailed and specific types of processing trade. Among all types295
of processing trade, two are the most important: “processing-with-assembly” and “processing-with-
inputs”. Both types of processing trade require certain certifications and licenses. For processing-
with-assembly, the Chinese firms import raw material or parts from their foreign partners without
paying for the materials and custom duty. However, they must re-export the final products to
the same foreign partners after processing. This trade regime was very popular before year 2000300
because it imposed a smaller credit constraint on Chinese firms (Feenstra et al. 2014). However,
it now only account for a very small portion of total Chinese imports. For processing-with-inputs,
Chinese firms pay the custom duties for imported inputs first. They get a full rebate on import
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duties only after exporting the goods that used these imported inputs.8
The special duty-free policy on processing imports remained largely unchanged during the trade305
war.9 Therefore, we should expect ordinary imports were subject to larger impact of tariffs while
processing imports should not be heavily affected at least in the short-run. In the data, I directly
observe the trade regime of each transaction, so I split my data into processing and non-processing
imports and estimate equation (2)-(4) again to test this hypothesis.
Table 7 shows the results using the month-to-month difference and is analog to table 4 panel A.310
It shows that almost all the impact we observed in table 4 are coming from the impact on ordinary
imports. Column (1)-(3) in table 7, panel B show that import quantities, values and before-duty
unit prices were not changed significantly for processing import.
Table 8 is analog to table 5 panel A. Column (1) shows that while the Chinese import demand
elasticity is high for ordinary imports, it is inelastic for processing import. Column (2) shows that315
while the US export supply elasticity is positive for ordinary imports in the short-run, I cannot
reject a horizontal supply curve for the processing imports. Table A1 and A2 in the appendix show
the estimation results in twelve-month differences and deliver similar results.
The results in this section highlight the importance of considering the trade structure and
distributional consequences of the US-China trade war. On one side, due to China’s free-duty policy320
on processing imports, Chinese firms that completely or partially engaged in processing trade may
not be largely affected (although they have to face the US import tariffs when exporting). On the
other side, previous literature that estimated the impact of trade-war from the US perspective may
have over-estimated the welfare loss because they cannot distinguish processing and ordinary trade
when analyzing the effect of China’s retaliatory tariffs on US exports.325
Meanwhile, the global value chain are transforming the nature of production during the past
8Note here, if a Chinese firm imports foreign inputs but sell the final products to the domestic market after
processing, the custom duties will not be refunded.
9All the official documents on retaliatory tariffs published by the Ministry of Finance of China state that “For
products from the United States included in the tariffs list, the tariffs will be added in addition to the current baseline
tariffs. Current duty-free and duty-reduction policy will remain unchanged. Tariff deduction is not applied to the
products on the list.” This statement is ambiguous and it is difficult to tell whether processing imports still enjoy
the duty-free policy. However, I find solid evidence support that processing imports remain largely unaffected during
the trade war. First, I find explanatory documents from professional lawyers implying that according to the Chinese
Customs Law the current duty-free policy on processing import remain valid even for products involved in the trade
war. Second, many Chinese firms that engaged in processing imports stated that they were not affected by the
import tariff increases. For example, a large listed company in China made a public announcement in 2019 saying
they confirmed with the Chinese Custom and their imported cotton products from the US would still be duty-free
as processing imports.
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Table 7: Impact of Chinese Tariffs on Imports






(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ln(1 + τict) -1.29*** -1.99*** -0.70*** 0.30
(0.31) (0.26) (0.18) (0.18)
Product × time FE Y Y Y Y
Country × time FE Y Y Y Y
Product × country FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.12
N 1,967,462 1,967,462 1,967,462 1,967,462






(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ln(1 + τict) -0.28 -0.32 -0.04 0.96***
(0.33) (0.31) (0.18) (0.18)
Product × time FE Y Y Y Y
Country × time FE Y Y Y Y
Product × country FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.13
N 1,092,999 1,092,999 1,092,999 1,092,999
Notes: Column (1)-(4) report log changes in import quantities, values, before-duty
unit values, and duty-inclusive unit values regressed on log changes in statutory tariff
rates. Robust standard errors in the parentheses are clustered by country and HS-8.
Significance: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
several decades. Instead of “made in China” or “made in USA”, more products are actually “made
in the world”. Therefore, while trade wars have always been disruptive, they are particularly
expensive and divisive in the global value chain era (Blanchard 2019). The global value chains
could be an important channel of transmitting the impact of import tariffs to exports because they330
can amplify shocks (Handley et al. 2020).
To bring production and jobs back to the US was one important incentive of the US import
tariffs. However, Trump’s administration has imposed tariffs disproportionately on imported in-
termediate inputs (Bown and Zhang 2019). Therefore, the import tariffs could potentially backfire
and shift the production away from the US. The recent work by Handley et al. (2020) shows that335
a large share of US exports were facing increased tariffs on importing inputs during the trade war,
which in turn leads to a even larger decline in exporting. Flaaen and Pierce (2019) also show
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Table 8: IV Estimation of Chinese Import Demand Elasticity and Foreign Export
Supply Elasticity









Product × time FE Y Y
Country × time FE Y Y
Product × country FE Y Y
N 1,967,462 1,967,462









Product × time FE Y Y
Country × time FE Y Y
Product × country FE Y Y
N 1,092,999 1,092,999
Notes: Robust standard errors in the parentheses are clustered by
country and HS-8. Significance: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
that U.S. manufacturing industries more exposed to tariff increases experience relative reductions
in employment as a positive effect from import protection is offset by larger negative effects from
rising input costs and retaliatory tariffs. In the later stage of the trade war, Trump’s administra-340
tion initiated a tariff exclusion process for Chinese products and over 2,500 US firms filed for tariff
exclusions for Chinese imports. However, failure of considering the global value chain linkages when
the administration first imposed the import protection may have already added large unintentional
burdens on US producers.
By contrast, although the Chinese government imposed protection at a similar magnitude, the345
duty-free policy on processing imports served as a build-in mechanic to protect the Chinese exporters
in the global value chain era. In other words, such policy prevented the Chinese import tariffs to
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backfire on Chinese exporting, which is one major driver of China’s economy growth.
4.3. Trade Diversion Effect
Although the primary focus of this paper is on the Chinese import side, one question that is of350
great public interest is whether there was trade diversion effect on Chinese exports following the US
import tariffs. Were Chinese exporters reorienting or even dumping their products towards other
countries? During the trade war, firms as well as politicians from multiple countries have expressed
concerns that China may lower the prices of the products in order to sell them in new markets
other than the US. If so, the US-China trade war may have caused collateral damage on domestic355
firms in EU and other countries (Gonzalez and Veron 2019). To formally assess the extend of trade
diversion, I propose a simple regression to check the relationship between US import tariffs and
Chinese exports to the rest of the world other than the US:
∆log(RoWi) = β∆log(1 + Tariff
US
i ) + fi + ǫi (5)
where on the left hand side, I take the difference of the total Chinese export quantity (and value)
of product i at the HS-6 level to all countries other than the US between 2019 Q4 and 2017 Q4.360
Because many products experienced multiple rounds of tariff increases, comparing the change before
(2017 Q4) and after (2019 Q4) the trade war yields a less noisy trend. On the right hand side,
TariffUSi represents the effective US import tariffs on product i. Because most US imports tariffs
were being set at the HS-8 level but the HS code across countries are only comparable at the HS-6
level, I first use the publicly available administrative US import data (HS-10 level) from the US365
Census Bureau to calculate the average US import tariff at the HS-6 level using 2017 total trade
value as weights. I then merge the trade weighted tariff to the Chinese monthly export data. fi
represents the product fixed effects at the HS-2 level and the robust standard error ǫi is clustered
at the HS-6 level.
However, despite all the discussion about trade diversion, it looks like that there is no systematic370
diversion going on. Table 9 shows that the US import tariffs have no impacts on the over all Chinese
export quantity and value to the rest of the world.
To further assess the trade diversion effect at the product-level, I choose several key products
that were subjected to the US import tariffs during the trade war and visualize the trends. Figure
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Table 9: Trade Diversion Effect
∆log(RoW Quantity) ∆log(RoW V alue)
(1) (2)
∆log(1 + TariffUSi ) -0.12 0.40
(0.30) (0.26)
Product FE (HS-2) Y Y
R2 0.04 0.05
N 4,779 4,779
Notes: Robust standard errors in the parentheses are clustered at
the HS-6 level. Significance: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Figure plots the Chinese export trends for aluminium, vehicle parts, communication apparatus and
garments.The vertical line marks the beginning of the trade war.
3 plots the trends of Chinese export to the US and to the rest of the world for aluminium, vehicle375
parts, communication apparatus and garments. China was a major exporter to the US in all these
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four products which were subjected to different levels of tariffs. However, while the graphs indicate
that there was potentially some trade diversion in aluminium, I do not observe the same effect in
other products. This result suggests that there might be considerable heterogeneity across products
or sectors that may mask the overall variations. In table A3 in the appendix, I explore one potential380
source of heterogeneity by interacting the US import tariff with Rauch classification (Rauch 1999)
and import demand elasticities estimated by Soderbery (2018). However, neither interaction term
yields significant results which implies that product differentiation or elasticity are not driving




The previous estimations treat the tariff changes during the trade war as exogenous and assume
that the changes are uncorrelated with potential demand and supply shocks. To support this
identification assumption, I test the pre-trends by regressing the import outcomes before the trade390
war (i.e., year 2017) on the subsequent tariff changes. The equation I estimate is as following:
∆
2017
log[zic] = η∆2018−2019log(1 + τic) + fi + fc + ǫic (6)
where z ∈ {q, p×q, p, p}≡ {import quantity, total import value, duty-exclusive unit value, duty-
inclusive unit value}. The left hand side is the average monthly change of each of four outcomes
from 2017:1-2017:12. ∆2018−2019log(1+ τic) represents the net log changes in import tariff rates for
product i from country c between 2018:1 and 2019:12. The regression control for HS-8 product and395
country fixed effects. Robust standard errors are two-way clustered by country and HS-8.
Table 10 reports the estimation results. There is no statistical significant relationship between
pre-trend outcomes and the subsequent Chinese import tariffs. This result, combined with the
event-study above, suggest that targeted products from the US were not on different trends before
the trade war which supports the main identification assumption in this paper.400
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∆2018−2019log(1 + τic) 0.12 0.15 0.03 0.03
(0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07)
Product FE Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
N 98,264 98,264 98,264 98,264
Notes: Robust standard errors in the parentheses are clustered by country
and HS-8. Significance: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
5.2. Agricultural Products
The estimation results in this paper assign one common elasticity across all products and sectors
which may mask variations. One important sector that may react differently to tariffs is the
agricultural sector. Agricultural products have long been a very important product category in the
US-China trade negotiations. They account for a significant share of Chinese imports from US. They405
were also the key element in the recently signed Phase 1 US-China deal. Meanwhile, agricultural
products that US exports, such as soy beans, have a relatively high elasticity of substitution.
Therefore, we might expect that during the trade war, agricultural products from US experienced
larger impact from Chinese import tariffs.
In table 11, I split the data into agricultural and non-agricultural products and re-estimate410
equation (2) at the month-to-month differences.10 The short-run impact of Chinese tariffs are much
larger on the agricultural products in terms of quantities and values. Also, column (3) of table 11
panel A indicates no impact of tariff increases on before-duty unit values on agricultural products.
This suggests complete tariff pass-through and providing evidence that the incidence of Chinese
import tariffs on agricultural products is borne by Chinese importers. On the contrast, column (3)415
in panel B implies that the finding of incomplete tariff pass-through in table 5 is likely to be driven
by non-agricultural products only. Table A4 in the appendix examine the same specification in
twelve-month differences. In the relatively long-run, the impact of tariffs on agriculture products
were even larger in terms of import quantities and values while the impact on before-duty prices
10Products with HS-2 code as 01-24, 33, 40, 41, 51, 52 are considered as agricultural products here.
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were still relatively small.420
Table 11: Impact of Chinese Tariffs on Imports






(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ln(1 + τict) -2.41*** -2.44*** -0.03 0.97***
(0.55) (0.50) (0.21) (0.21)
Product × time FE Y Y Y Y
Country × time FE Y Y Y Y
Product × country FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.14
N 261,439 261,439 261,439 261,439






(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ln(1 + τict) -0.30 -0.96*** -0.65*** 0.35*
(0.35) (0.28) (0.18) (0.18)
Product × time FE Y Y Y Y
Country × time FE Y Y Y Y
Product × country FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11
N 2,066,240 2,066,240 2,066,240 2,066,240
Notes: Column (1)-(4) report log changes in import quantities, values, before-duty
unit values, and duty-inclusive unit values regressed on log changes in statutory tariff
rates. Each specification is run on monthly differences. Robust standard errors in
the parentheses are clustered by country and HS-8. Significance: * 0.10, ** 0.05, ***
0.01.
6. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of the 2018-2019 trade war from China’s perspective. I first show
the direct impact of Chinese import tariffs on trade quantities and prices. Both Chinese import
quantities and values dropped sharply following the tariffs. The before-duty unit values decreased
in the short-run, suggesting incomplete tariff pass-through and a tariff incidence borne by both425
Chinese importers and US exporters. Using Chinese import tariff variation, I also provide estimates
of Chinese import demand and US export supply elasticities.
Furthermore, I consider the role of global value chains in the trade war and highlight the role
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of Chinese processing trade regime. Chinese processing imports enjoy a special duty-free tariff
treatment which remained largely unchanged even during the trade war. As a consequence, I430
find that the impact of the tariffs are almost purely driven by ordinary imports while there is
no statistically significant effect on processing imports. These results highlight the importance to
consider the institutional details in trade policy–especially the difference between China and US in
this contex. Recent study have suggested that the impact of such tit-for-tat tariff increases would
be more disruptive because the existence of global value chain could potentially magnify the impact435
and even backfire on one country’s export or labor market. However, I show that the Chinese
special duty-free policy on processing trade may have served as a built-in mechanism to protect
domestic firms from the damage of the trade war through the global value chain channel.
While the the paper mainly focuses on the Chinese import side, I also examine the potential
diversion effect of Chinese exports as a result of the US tariffs. However, despite all the discussion440
about trade diversion, I show that there is no systematic diversion going on except in some selected
products.
Let me finish by noting two important limitations. First, this paper only provides short-run
analysis on the impact of the trade war from the Chinese perspective. However, the long-run
consequence of the trade war such as future trade agreements as well as the re-shaping of global445
value chains are yet to be examined. Second, this paper does not provide detailed analysis on the
sectoral or regional level, which I believe are important areas to focus on for future research.
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Appendix510
Table A.1: Impact of Chinese Tariffs on Imports (Twelve-month Differences)






(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ln(1 + τict) -5.16*** -3.71*** 1.44*** 2.44***
(0.22) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13)
it, ct, ic FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.24 0.24 0.20 0.20
N 1,273,697 1,273,697 1,273,697 1,273,697




(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ln(1 + τict) -0.57** -0.36 0.20 1.20***
(0.27) (0.23) (0.15) (0.15)
it, ct, ic FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.22
N 707,186 707,186 707,186 707,186
Notes: Column (1)-(4) report log changes in import quantities, values, before-duty unit
values, and duty-inclusive unit values regressed on log changes in statutory tariff rates.
Product-time, country-time and product-country fixed effects are included. Robust
standard errors in the parentheses are clustered by country and HS-8. Significance: *
0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
29
Table A.2: IV Estimation of Chinese Import Demand Elasticity and Foreign Export
Supply Elasticity (Twelve-month Differences)









it, ct, ic FE Y Y
N 1,273,697 1,273,697









it, ct, ic FE Y Y
N 707,186 707,186
Notes: Robust standard errors in the parentheses are clustered by
country and HS-8. Significance: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Table A.3: Trade Diversion Effect Heterogeneity
∆log(RoW Quantity) ∆log(RoW Quantity)
(1) (2)
∆log(1 + TariffUSi ) -0.16 -0.14
(0.43) (0.40)
∆log(1 + TariffUSi )× Rauch Differentiated (0/1) 0.62
(0.39)
∆log(1 + TariffUSi )× Soderbery Elasticity (2018) 0.00
(0.01)
Product FE (HS-2) Y Y
R2 0.05 0.05
N 3,864 3,303
Notes: Column (1) shows the result by interacting trade value weighted US import tariff variable
with the Rauch classification (Rauch 1999); Column (2) shows the interaction with import demand
elasticities estimated by Soderbery (2018). Standard errors are clustered by HS-2. Significance: *
0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table A.4: Impact of Chinese Tariffs on Imports (Twelve-month Differences)






(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ln(1 + τict) -4.89*** -4.62*** 0.27* 1.27***
(0.39) (0.35) (0.14) (0.14)
it, ct, ic FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.27 0.28 0.24 0.25
N 167,972 167,972 167,972 167,972






(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ln(1 + τict) -3.53*** -2.49*** 1.04*** 2.04***
(0.21) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
it, ct, ic FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.19
N 1,344,959 1,344,959 1,344,959 1,344,959
Notes: Column (1)-(4) report log changes in import quantities, values, before-duty
unit values, and duty-inclusive unit values regressed on log changes in statutory tariff
rates. Each specification is run on twelve-month Differences. Product-time, country-
time and product-country fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors in the
parentheses are clustered by country and HS-8. Significance: * 0.10, ** 0.05, ***
0.01.






(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆τict -0.68*** -1.04*** -0.36*** 0.43***
(0.24) (0.21) (0.11) (0.11)
it, ct, ic FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.11
N 2,328,703 2,328,703 2,328,703 2,328,703
Notes: Column (1)-(4) report log changes in import quan-
tities, values, before-duty unit values, and duty-inclusive
unit values regressed on log changes in statutory tariff rates.
Each regression is run on monthly differences. Product-time,
country-time and product-country fixed effects are included.
Robust standard errors in the parentheses are clustered by
country and HS-8. Significance: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table A.6: Impact of Chinese Tariffs on Imports (Semi-elasticity)






(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆τict -0.97*** -1.49*** -0.53*** 0.26*
(0.25) (0.22) (0.15) (0.15)
it, ct, ic FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.12
N 1,967,462 1,967,462 1,967,462 1,967,462






(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆τict -0.31 -0.35 -0.03 0.83***
(0.29) (0.27) (0.16) (0.16)
it, ct, ic FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.13
N 1,092,999 1,092,999 1,092,999 1,092,999
Notes: Column (1)-(4) report log changes in import quantities, values, before-duty
unit values, and duty-inclusive unit values regressed on log changes in statutory tariff
rates. Each regression is run on monthly differences. Product-time, country-time and
product-country fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors in the parentheses
are clustered by country and HS-8. Significance: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table A.7: Impact of Chinese Tariffs on Imports (Including MFN and RTA Changes)






(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ln(1 + τict) -0.33 -0.69** -0.36** 0.64***
(0.34) (0.33) (0.15) (0.15)
Product × time FE Y Y Y Y
Country × time FE Y Y Y Y
Product × country FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.11
N 2,307,350 2,307,350 2,307,350 2,307,350






(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ln(1 + τict) -2.06*** -1.56*** 0.51** 1.51***
(0.78) (0.60) (0.21) (0.21)
Product × time FE Y Y Y Y
Country × time FE Y Y Y Y
Product × country FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.19
N 1,511,344 1,511,344 1,511,344 1,511,344
Notes: Column (1)-(4) report log changes in import quantities, values, before-duty unit val-
ues, and duty-inclusive unit values regressed on log changes in statutory tariff rates (including
MFN and RTA changes during the trade war). Robust standard errors in the parentheses
are clustered by country and HS-8. Significance: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table A.8: Impact of Chinese Tariffs on Imports (Including MFN and RTA Changes)






(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ln(1 + τict) -0.82** -1.17*** -0.35* 0.65***
(0.36) (0.39) (0.20) (0.20)
Product × time FE Y Y Y Y
Country × time FE Y Y Y Y
Product × country FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.12
N 1,954,678 1,954,678 1,954,678 1,954,678






(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ln(1 + τict) -0.28 -0.32 -0.04 0.96***
(0.33) (0.31) (0.18) (0.18)
Product × time FE Y Y Y Y
Country × time FE Y Y Y Y
Product × country FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.13
N 1,092,999 1,092,999 1,092,999 1,092,999
Notes: Column (1)-(4) report log changes in import quantities, values, before-duty unit
values, and duty-inclusive unit values regressed on log changes in statutory tariff rates
(including MFN and RTA changes during the trade war). Robust standard errors in the
parentheses are clustered by country and HS-8. Significance: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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